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GERMAN IMPERIALISM IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 
German colonial policy, according to its proponents, formed an integral 
part of Weltpolitik . I The term came into wide usage during the 18905 and 
was closely Iinked to the striving for Weltmacht. 2 80th words are hard to 
translate. The term Weltpolitik passed into popular currency after Emperor 
Wilhelm 11 had used the phrase in his speech of January 18, 1896 in wh ich 
he commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Ger-
man Reich. Previously Weltpolitik - in the sense of promoting colonial en-
terprise and foreign trade-might be said to have begun in 1884-:188S, the 
years in wh ich Bismarck had acquired a colonial empire in Africa. But 
under Bismarck, overseas policy had formed a mere episode. As the German 
chancellor had explained to Eugen Wolf, an explorer, much to the colonial 
enthusiasts' regret (on December S, 1888): "Your map of Africa looks nice, 
but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia, and here is France, and 
we are here at the very center; that is my map of Africa."J Under Wilhelm 11, 
however, especially after 1897, Weltpolitik achieved this same importance as 
Europapolitik - implying an ilI-defined yearning for power and prestige on a 
global scale. 
Germany, by this time, had undergone profound economic and social 
changes. Between 1870 and 1900, the population of the Reich had grown from 
forty-one to fifty-six million. Coal production had increased from thirty-four 
million to 149 million tons, and steel production from 0.3 million tons to 6.7 
million tons. Germany had pioneered a host of new industries and had be-
come the chief manufacturing country in Europe. The old Prussian simplici-
ty -Iovingly described by writers such as Theodore Fontane - had widely 
given way to a new spirit of national self-assertion. Admittedly, the extent of 
German chauvinism at the time can easily be exaggerated. 
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Wilhelminian Germany was not run solely by monocled Guards officers, 
boastful steel magnates, and obsequious professors - men ridiculed at the 
time in the pages of Simplicissimus and, later, by Allied propaganda in the 
First World War. Dut undoubtedly, there was a new spirit in the land, a spirit 
of over-confidence, the spirit of the nouveau riche. Once America had 
seemed das lAnd der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten, the land of Iimitless 
opportunities - now Imperial Germany seemed to have appropriated this 
title for herself. 
When the quest ion is raised what really made up German Weltpolitik it is 
evident that its contents and its aims are rather vague. The generation of 
Wilhelm 11 had banished from its consciousness all the apprehensions which 
had haunted Dismarck with regard to Germany's position in the center of 
Europe, above all the fear of a future two-front war and of a Franco-
Russian rapprochement. It was an optimistic and forward-looking genera-
tion. It was aware of its vitality, proud of the steep rise of the economy and 
of the quick work of political unification. The path to further success and 
progress looked smooth and easy. Public attention was irresistibly drawn 
from the cramped confines of Germany to the vast spaces overseas. There 
was the British empire anxiously trying to keep its possessions together, 
adding new strips of territory to its old dominions in order to be paramount 
in the world. There were the new ebullient powers like Japan and America 
eliminating their limitations and extending their frontiers. There were also 
France and Russia leaving Europe behind and reaching out into the spaces 
of Africa and Asia. 
In view of this general tendency to playa part on the world's stage, the 
Germans feit justified in thinking that there were hardly any or no dangers 
at all to their central position in Europe. Ludwig Dehio put it in these terms: 
"Germany wh ich up to that time was squeezed together uneasily now 
breathed more freely, its pulse beat more cheerfully.'" Explaining the same 
exuberant feeling of strength Lewis C. B. Seaman writes: "To the Germans, 
circumstances were a mere anvil and policy aseries of irresistible hammer 
blows shaping the inevitable."' And Fritz Hartung says there was no alterna-
tive to German policy but to transgress with vigor the lines drawn by Dis-
marck.' In view of Germany's rapidly growing population, her demand for 
raw materials of all sorts, and her want of outlets for her economic products 
the country could not but respond to the challenge of imperialism and 
Weltpolitik lest she should be relegated to second or third place like Austria-
Hungary and Spain. 
The moral justification of the claim to Weltpolitik, which did not mean 
hegemony but equality with the other world powers, derived not only from 
Germany's most recent national development, but from modern European 
history in general. Thus it was widely held that Weltpolitik was, in fact, 
merely the transfer of the policy of the European balance of power to the 
world at large. Just as in the preceding centuries the balance of power 
Oennan Imperialism in HistoricaJ Perspective lS3 
system had usually served the purpose of warding off the hegemony to 
which one of the European powers had aspired it was thought quite natural 
that Britain would have to share her supremacy in the world with others. 
The most distinguished of the contemporary German historians (such as 
Max Lenz, Hans Delbrück, Herman Oncken, Erich Marcks, Friedrich 
Meinecke) propagated the view that the transfer of the European balance of 
power system on to a worldwide balance of power was an organic develop-
ment of Rankean ideas and thoughts. They all believed in a concert of world 
powers evolving from the traditional concert of European powers in the 
process of which Britain's supremacy overseas was to be challenged among 
them by Germany. 
Passing on to other contemporary leaders of public opinion, e.g., to the 
"liberal imperialists" such as Friedrich Naumann, Max Weber, and Paul 
Rohrbach whose ideas may be taken to represent a broad cross-section of 
political thinking of the time, one meets the same train of thoughts cen-
tering on the demand for a world power status for Germany. In his "Nation-
al-Social Catechism" of 1891 Friedrich Naumann defined imperialism as the 
outgrowth of nationalism: "What is nationalism? It is the motive power of 
the German people to spread its influence all over the globe.'" 1\vo years 
be fore , Max Weber, in his Freiburg inaugural address, had given expression 
to this widely held view when he said that Germany's unification was a 
juvenile prank which the nation had committed in its old days ,nd which, 
because of its costliness, ought to have been omitted if it was to be the 
conclusion and not the starting-point of German world power politics.· 
If the quest ion is raised on what idea this widely feit striving for power 
was based it emerges that there was really no specific positive object behind 
it. The great negative object, though, was unmistakable: to drive Britain 
from her paramount position and to place in her stead a free system of equal 
world powers where Germany would occupy the position due to her. That 
Welrpolitik was an object in itself, however vague its contents might be, is 
seen in Naumann's phrase: "Vou must conquer something, anyihing in the 
world in order to be something."· 
Weltpolitik served no other purpose than the punuit of power. Behind 
such an object there could be no great idea transporting other nations or 
pointing to the future. In order to understand the ideological poverty of 
German Welrpolitik one must think of the great struggles for hegemony of 
European history-of the sixteenth century, of the Reformation and Count-
er Reformation with their abundance of ideas, of the France of Louis XIV 
spreading French civilization all over the world, of the French Revolution 
with its lasting impact on the history of ideas. In view of this one is bound to 
see in Germany's quest for Weltpolitik - to quote Ludwig Dehio again - "a 
striking discrepancy between our vital energies and our spiritual ones."'o All 
the other great powers at the end of the nineteenth century were able to 
point to some specific goal they wanted to attain: France to Alsace-lorraine, 
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Russia to Constantinople, Britain to the maintenance of her empire, Aus-
tria-Hungary to the destruction of Serbia; whereas Germany could nowhere 
and never be satisfied bec~\lse it had no specific object to pursue. 
If attention is focused on the diplomatic documents in order to view 
Weltpolitik not as an idea, but in action, the aimlessness abounds again. 
Those who promoted and practiced Weltpolitik may be charged with having 
misjudged the concomitant dangers and with having underrated the difficul-
ties they incurred when submitting their demands; they may be charged with 
im patience in reaping the fruits of Weltpolitik before they were ripe. Yet, 
their supreme folly was that they did not pursue any vital object with their 
Weltpolitik which would have legitimized their demands. They wanted to 
meddle in everything without being able to explain why they did so. They 
pursued prestige for its own sake. 
Thus, the explanation given in 1897 for the acquisition of Kiaochow was 
that Germany needed a coaling station for her navy - which at that time 
hardly existed, but which was then created, as A. J. P. Taylor put it, in order 
to protect the coaling station. 11 Bülow acknowledged in later years that 
Germany's appearance on the Chinese coast was directly linked to the first 
Navy Bill and was "a first practical step on the road of Weltpolitik . "Il The 
first Moroccan crisis of 1 904-1 90S was artificially created by Germany. 
Holstein at that time analyzed the German motives in the following way: 
"The task of a great power does not merely consist in protecting its territori-
al boundaries [Bismarck had regarded this as the main object of his foreign 
policy), but also in defending the just interests Iying beyond those bounda-
ries." "Just interests" according to him were those that were not confronted 
with another stronger right. Germany must protest against Morocco's an-
nexation by France - not for any material reasons, but "in order to guard her 
prestige" and "protect her honour as a great power. "I) The demand for an 
international conference was raised not in order to solve the Moroccan 
crisis, but to demonstrate Germany's power. When Germany's politicians 
finally found themselves in the impasse of Aigeciras, Bülow regarded it of 
the utmost importance "that we should get out of this Moroccan blunder in 
such a wayas willleave our prestige in the world intact."'4 Almost the same 
game was reproduced during the second Moroccan crisis. Alfred von Ki-
derlen-Wächter, Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, told a friend of 
his in 1911 that it was necessary first of all "to bang our fist on the table."" 
Judgment on Germany's Weltpolitik must be Severe as it was an artificial 
product. Germany's map of the world, like Bismarck's map of Africa a few 
years before, was confined to Europe. Germany had no vital interests to 
defend outside Europe, . against either Moroccan slave traders, Balkan 
sheep-stealers, Mesopotamian desert sheiks, Chinese opium growers, or 
Polynesian beauties. Her vital interests, political as weil as economic, were 
centered in Europe. These involved security for a country wedged in by two 
hostile neighbors; they could not be jeopardized ror a minimal share in the 
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Moroccan or Chinese market or in order to show the German flag every-
where between Agadir in Morocco and Apia on Samoa. 
This harsh judgment on Germany's Weltpolitik must not be misconstrued 
in the sense that it was something amoraI or bad in itself. The demand of a 
dynamic power to grow materially and to increase its political prestige is a 
normal wish. However, criticism must be leveled against the loud, frivolous, 
and reckless manner in which the demand for a share in the world's domin-
ion was projected, against the absence of sound judgment of the dangers 
and difficulties lying on the path to world power, against the fact, in short, 
that Germany had ov:rreached herself the moment she had entered the 
arena of Weltpolitik . 
COIONIAL POLICY 
A similarly negative judgment must be passed on Geimany's colonial 
policy between 1884 and 1914. Colonial policy was, besides the navy pro-
gram after 1898, the most visible expression of German Wellpolilik. It may 
be divided into two distinct phases. The first is the Bismarckian phase 
lasting from 1884 to 1890, but centering mainly on the years 1884-1885; the 
second is the Wilhelmian phase from 1890 to 1914." 
In 1884-1885 the geographical center of Germany's colonial activity lay in 
Africa. There all the major German colonies were acquired: Togo, Camer-
oon, German Southwest and German East Africa. Added to them were 
German New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon and 
Marshallislands. In the next phase the center of activity gravitated to the 
Far East and to the Pacific. The following colonies were acquired in 1898 
and 1899: Kiaochow from China; the Carolines, Marianas, and Palau 15-
lands (all purchased from Spain after Germany had lost her war with the 
United States), and the western parts of Samoa through an exchange of 
territory with Britain. The newly acquired area amounted to little more than 
0.1 percent of the colonies hitherto owned. 
Nothing shows up more poignantly the aimlessness of German Wellpo-
litik than these simple figures. Weltpo/ilik was launched at a time when the 
overseas territories had al ready been carved up among the colonial powers 
except for the south polar region, the North African territories of Morocco 
and Tripoli, both of which were nominally still under Thrkish suzerainty, 
and parts of Asia (mainly China). 
The reason for Germany being able to "augment" her colonies by these 
far-flung territories in the Far East and in the Pacific in 1898-1899 was the 
favorable international situation very similar to the one which had enabled 
her acquisitions of 1884-1885. The temporary worsening of the Anglo-
Russian antagonism in the Far East (Russian penetration of North China, 
acquisition of port Arthur and the Anglo-French dash over Fashoda in the 
Sudan as weil as Britain's predicament in South Africa and the Spanish-
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American War) enabled the quick successive acquisition of the Pacific is-
lands. 
The motives for Bismarck's decision to acquire colonies have now been 
debated for exactly one century. There is general consensus that, as is usual 
with Bismarck's political actions, there is a host of reasons which made hirn 
act in 1884. There is no consensus, however, as to the order of priority to be 
given to the individual motives. The favorable international situation is 
obvious. Since the occupation of Merv by the Russians in February 1884 
and their advance toward Afghanistan, Anglo-Russian relations reached the 
brink of war over India. In January 1885 the English public was stunned by 
the annihilation of Gordon Pasha's expedition by the Mahdi at Khartoum . 
• 
Oddly enough, no scholar has as yet investigated the German documents 
in order to find out the effects of Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 on 
Bismarck's policy. It may weil be that there lies the key for his colonial 
acquisitions. At any rate, Britain's precarious position in Egypt was a won-
derfullever at Bismarck's command in handling his relations with Britain. 
Thus, State Secretary Herbert von Bismarck referred to the "Egyptian apple 
of discord" as "a real Godsend for our foreign policy."17 
It is similarly curious that historians have neglected a personal faetor 
wh ich was at various times of the highest importance in Bismarck's career 
and which deeply influenced his political actions: his uneasiness about the 
impending death of the old Emperor William; about the reorientation of 
Germany's domestic and foreign policy through his Anglophile successor 
Frederick 111 who, under the influence of his wife Victoria (daughter of 
Queen Victoria), and guided by his liberal entourage, would introduce liber-
al reforms in the interior and would lean toward England in his external 
relations. Given such a situation Bismarck's days would be quickly num-
bered. 11 
Only Erich Eyck seems hitherto to have taken seriously Bismarck's fear of 
a future "Gladstone cabinet" in Berlin and connected this concern to Bis-
marck's bid for colonies in 1884-1885. According to this reasoning, Bis-
marck, in order to avert this personal and - in his eyes - national calamity, 
tried everytbing to create difficulties in Germany's relations with Britain so 
as to make a pro-British stance of Frederick impossible and pledge him to a 
pro-Russian one instead - the corner-stone of his foreign policy. German 
colonial initiatives in Africa were the best means of creating bad relations 
with Britain, even more so as they might be synchronized with France, 
Britain's traditional colonial enemy. Furthermore, they were also the most 
obvious means of discrediting the left Liberals (the Ludwig Bambergers and 
Eugen Richters), the staunchest supporters of Frederick's and the most 
outspoken anticolonial pressure group in Germany at a time when public 
opinion was rapidly swinging round in favor of German colonial ventures." 
Nobody has as yet investigated the election campaign of the faU of 1884, 
waged by Bismarck with anti-liberal and pro-colonial slogans. Bismarck was 
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at least partly successful in the elections when the left Liberals dropped from 
106 to sixty-seven seats in the Reichstag. He finally got out of this eleft stick 
when the Gladstone cabinet in London had to give way to a new Conserva-
tive one under Salisbury in June 1885 which meant a sudden improvement in 
Anglo-German relations and a prompt end of Bism~rck's active meddling 
on the African scene. 
There is, even without having recourse to the unpublished documents, 
quite a formidable array of evidence iIlustrating the elose link between the 
domestic scene and the colonial one. lO 
Bismarck's personal hatred of Gladstone - whom Bismarck's el1emies, the 
Liberals, took as their model-is weil known. In 1884-1885 he told everyone 
who wanted to hear it that Gladstone was the incarnation of political imbe-
cility and incompetence, meaning that a German Gladstone would amount 
to the same. 
As early as June 6, 1884, Holstein wrote in his diary that the chancellor, 
who up to now wanted to have nothing to do with colonial mauers, was 
obviously using them as "a means of combating foreign influences.» "No 
other questions [than the colonial one] is so liable to put the future Kaiserin 
with her Anglophile tendencies in a false position vis-a-vis the German 
nation."2' Again on September 19, he notes that Bismarck had told Czar 
Alexander that the only purpose of Germany's colonial policy was to drive a 
wedge between the crown prince and England. And to one of his ministers 
Bismarck had said: "All this colonial business is a fraud, but we need it for 
the elections. "22 
When shortly after Bismarck's fall in March 1890, Ambassador Hans von 
Schweinitz asked Herbert von Bismarck to explain his father's colonial ad-
venture of 1884-1885, the lauer replied: "When we launched our colonial 
policy the Crown Prince was not yet iII and we had to be prepared for a long 
reign of his during which the English influence would be paramount .... In 
order to prevent this, the colonial policy had to be started which is popular 
and can at any time raise a conflict with England."2J In November 1896, 
Emperor Wilhelm 11 told Oswald von Richthofen, director of the Colonial 
Department: "Bismarck conceived of our entire colonial policy only to drive 
a wedge between ourselves and England on account of the 'English influ-
ences.' "2. 
After the fall of the Gladstone cabinet Bismarck swung round the helm 
and now clearly subordinated his colonial policy to an improvement of 
Anglo-German relations. He regarded good relations with Britain and the 
staying in office of her Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary lord Salisbury 
(Marquess Robert A. T. Gascoyne-Cecil) in office as"a hundred times more 
valuable ... than the whole of East Africa" or than "twenty swampy col-
onies in Africa.":~ He regarded the plans of Karl Peters to build a big 
German colony in Central Africa as "criminal" and asked Salisbury to put a 
stop to Peters' doings, if need be by force of arms. 26 
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Other motives may have played a part in Bismarck's bid for colonies, e.g. 
the desire to create an outlet to German commerce overseas in view of the 
protectionist tendencies of the major industrial countries. If so, he became 
quickly disillusioned about their economic value, even more so because 
German commerce and capital showed very Iiule inclination to become 
engaged in the colonies. 11 
Shifting the available evidence, it appears that Bismarck's colonial adven-
ture remained an episode because the danger of a German Gladstone cabi-
net soon vanished from the scene. The result of this episode was, neverthe-
less, that Germany was saddled with a colonial empire five times the size of 
the mother country. 
In the second phase of German colonial policy a new motive came to play 
an ever-growing part, especiallyat the end of the 18905: that is what has 
been termed social imperialism or colonial policy as a "factor of national 
integration." Colonial policy was to be treated as a grand national task 
diverting attention from social tension at home. Social imperialism, wrongly 
applied to Bismarck 's colonial policy, became after 1897 a main element of 
Sommlungspolitik. Bismarck had quickly lost interest in colonial policy. 
Financially - where he never really had any illusions - Germany's colonies 
.. 
were clearly vast areas subsidized by the German taxpayer. Neither banks 
nor industry wanted to invest money in those barren countries unless heavily 
protected by the state. Again, Bismarck had never shared the enthusiasm of 
the colonialists who regarded colonies as a recipient of Germans wishing to 
emigrate. At the end of the eighties he wanted to get rid of the financially 
deficient overseas territories . 
But although disillusionment about the economic and demographie as-
pects of the colonies spread in Germany they were now regarded as part and 
parcel of the prestige of an advancing imperialist power. It was incompatible 
with the spirit of the time, which thought and acted in categories of world-
wide rivalry, to haut down a f1ag in foreign continents simply because it did 
not yield immediate and tangible results. A good expression of this national-
ist spirit was the emperor's speech on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
founding of the German empire when he said that a new German world 
empire had grown from the German empire. Everywhere in faraway coun-
tries, he exclaimed, there are thousands of Germans; German goods, Ger-
man science, and knowhow go abroad. It must be Germany's duty to attach 
this greater German empire to the mother country.2I 
It has already been said above that Weltpolitik , inaugurated under such 
auspices, together with the domestic Sammlungspolitik, did not constitute a 
clear-cut goal conducive to unite the German nation socially. German colo-
nial policy always lacked a grand imperial program. Untill914 it remained a 
haphazard and improvised affaire Together with the hectic naval policy it 
constituted an insuperahle stumbling-block to improved relations with Brit-
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ain -a disastrous development leading to the outbreak of the First World 
War. 
THEBALANCE 
The historiography of German colonization has clearly profited from the 
process of decolonization which got under way during the 1950s. Up to that 
time, German colonial historiography had been one-sided in a political 
sense. Much of its inspiration had derived from adesire to refute the charge, 
made at Versailles in 1919, that Germans had shown themselves peculiarly 
unfit to govern backward peoples. Moreover, German scholars, like their 
colleagues in other European countries, had investigated colonialism almost 
solely from the standpoint of the metropolitan power. Since then the aspeets 
of research have changed fundamentally. A spate of v~luable books was 
published, both in East and in West Germany, that invesÜgate the develop-
ment of the German colonies in their own local and domestic settings.lt 
German colonial policy on the spot may be divided into three clearly 
distinct phases. The first phase under Bismarck embraced the acquisition 
proper. Bismarck's concept to have the newly acquired colonies administered 
by chartered companies and to reduce the state's intervention to a minimum 
was a gross miscalculation. Private initiative did not come forward; those 
chartered companies that had come to life in Southwest and East Africa 
quickly went bankrupt; the state had to take over willy-nilly. The subsequent 
phase, lasting for about fifteen years, was the time when the colonies were 
conquered militarily and when a very small number of Germans seuled in 
certain areas of the colonies. The end of· this phase of "pacification" is 
marked by an all-out war against the Herero in German Southwest Africa. 
This war marks the transition to the third phase characterized by the ap-
pointment of the enlightened Bernhard Dernburg in 1906 as head of the 
German colonial administration, the so-called Hottentot elections of 1907 
and the establishment of the Imperial Colonial Office (Reichsk%nia/aml) 
in the same year. Dernburg tried to convince his contemporaries that his 
entering office marked a new era in colonial administration after aperiod of 
utter chaos. He summed up his program in the following words: "Coloniza-
tion ... means utilization of the soil, of its resources ... and above all of 
its inhabitants for the benefit of the economy of the colonizing nation, and 
the lauer is pledged to repay (the indigenous population] with its higher 
civilization, its moral concepts, its better methods."lO 
I f a balance is struck on the three decades in which the German colonies . 
existed its main results are these: the demographie predictions ventured by 
members of the colonial lobby were relentlessly belied year after year to an 
overriding degree. One should keep the following figures in mind: in an area 
of almost 2.6 million square kilometers, Le. an area almost five times the 
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size of Germany, the population of Oermans amounted to 5,495 in 1904. 
This figure corresponds to the number of inhabitants of a large German 
village. Half of them Iived in German Southwest Africa. The total white 
population in the German colonies amounted to 8,000 in the same year, to 
over 15,000 in 1909, and to over 21,000 in 1911; i.e., the flgure rose steadily, 
but compared to the rise of the German population and to the number of 
emigrants (in 1881 222,000, later on dropping sharply, between 1871 and 
1901 about 2.75 million) the increase was infinitesimal in degree." It is 
obvious that the colonies could never be the living space for the "nation 
without space" (Volk ohne Raum), as was propagated in the colonial litera-
ture, and that it would never become one in the future. The German authori-
ties were realistic enough not only not to support, but to render emigration 
to the colonies systematically difficult. 
The balance sheet from an economic and financial point of view yields 
quite similar results.)J The colonies' share of Germany's foreign trade never 
surpassed the level of 0.5 percent during the last pre-war years. Germany's 
share of her colonies' overall trade diminished from an average of 35.2 
percent in the decade between 1894 and 1903 to 26.6 percent in the subse-
quent decade. Of the foreign countries trading with the German colonies, 
Britain and her colonies were foremost. Thus, Zanzibar in 1903 controlled 
more than half of the total trade of German East Africa, whereas Germany's 
share was a mere quarter (in 1912, though, it rose to over SO percent). On the 
Marianas and on Samoa foreign countries were in firm control of the is-
lands' trade; only in her West African colonies was Germany economieally 
paramount. In a word, the colonies were neither a market for German 
products nor a source for raw materials to any degree worth mentioning. 
The colonies as an area for capital investment played no part whatsoever. 
Up to 1913 Germany had invested about 505 million marks in her colonies. 
This corresponds to the amount of money which German financial institu-
dons invested in the South African gold mines in the 18905." Compared to 
the overall amount of German capital exported up to 1914 (twenty-five 
billion marks), the share of the German colonies does not surpass 2 per-
cent.)4 German foreign capital went first of all to European countries and to 
the Near East. Liule went overseas and less still to her own colonies - thus 
refuting all theories put forward at the time from Marxist quarters. 
This means that from an economic and financial point of view the Ger-
man colonial empire was an unprofitable affair. Except for Togo and Samoa 
no colony yielded a profit. For the administration of the other colonies the 
German taxpayer had to foot the bill. In the fiscal year 1912 the debt of the 
colonies had accrued to 171.48 million marks. For the years 1913 to 1917 a 
government grant of about twenty-nine million marks was earmarked annu-
ally. These figures do not include the indirect cost hidden in the government 
. subsidies to the shippiilg lines, the maintenance of the naval forees, ete. 
Instead of being regarded, as in the eighteenth eentury, as milch eows giving 
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milk to the mother country, the colonies in the age of imperialism developed 
into costly objects of prestige. 
The second phase of Germany's colonial history, 1890 to 1906, represent-
ed a time when sodal conditions radically changed: traditional systems of 
rule were questioned or destroyed by small groups of colonial administra-
tors, officers, and settlers; German rule was firmly established everywhere. 
But among the subjected peoples resistance was not stifled. In East Africa 
the bloody Maji Maji rising of 1906 occurred and in Southwest Africa it led 
to the Herero war, the first war of Wilhelminian Germany. In the second and 
third phases the indigeous population in some colonies was dedmated by 
compulsory labor assignments to the newly established plantations. This 
resulted in an acute labor shortage which most of the white settlers, whose 
thoughts moved in a Social Darwinist framework, were unable or unwilling 
to solve. The attempt to deal with this most acute problem began when the 
Imperial Colonial Office, with Dernburg at its head, was established in 
1907, although on the local level there were a few governors (like Theodor 
Leutwein in German Southwest Africa) who had recognized the dangers and 
tried to prevent thema The attempt, aimed at protecting the plantation la-
borers, had no great prospects of success because at ho me parliament was 
always loath to spend money for the colonial budget and because in the 
colonies the settlers and colonists in their shorl-sighted egoism tried to 
counteract thema 
In the third phase the new social stratification, which has recently been 
investigated by various historians, was fully developed. On the one hand 
there was the very small group of white masters; on the other the large group 
of the uprooied, badly paid and maltreated black subjects; astride the fence 
was the colonial government trying to adjust the conflicting interests of the 
two groups and acting according to Dernburg's maxim quoted above. This 
social interrelationship remained tense until the end of German coloniza-
tion. In German Southwest Africa it worsened irremediably, contrary to the 
views formerly held, since not only did the local government and the settlers 
have conflicting views on the treatment of the blacks whom they needed for 
their own survival, but the settlers were at loggerheads even among them-
selves. 
The various dark spots of German colonial rule have by no means become 
brighter through closer scrutiny in recent research. But time and distance 
also allow of a better assessment of the positive aspects of German colonial-
ism. Whereas the German colonies' contribution to the economy of the 
mother country was negligible, the impact of Germany on the economic 
development of her colonies was significant. European colonialism in gener-
al transformed the overseas territoriei - those in Africa especially - in a 
radical and revolutionary way. As the young Karl Marx had already pointed 
out, British rule in India set in motion the greatest social upheaval on the 
Asia continent. And Friedrich Engels had warned of idealizing pre-colonial 
162 Oermanslh the 1l'opics 
raiding ec:onomics and that "after all the modern bourgeois, With civiliza-
tion, industry and order . . . is preferable to the feudal lord or to the ma-
rauding robber."" As to the German colonies, the judgment passed by Lewis 
H. Gann and Peter Duignan seems to be just and well-balanced: "Within 
less than one generation the Germans accomplished a great deal. ... They 
introduced modern methods of scientifie research; they helped to pioneer 
the study of African linguistics, ethnography, and related sciences. They 
built harbors and roads; they set up new industries; they created railway 
systems .... Within thirty years the German colonies moved from the Iron 
Age into the era of steam power and the internal-combustion engine."JIo 
According to another view German colonial rule not only led to political 
enslavement, but also to spiritual emancipation. J7 In this sense an African 
scholar could write that colonialism was "the most important liberating 
factor the African mind has experienced in historiea) times."JI 
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